Promoting growth in Sri Lanka : lessons from East Asia

Sri Lanka's weak economic performance, although compounded by the civil war and budgetary imbalance, largely reflects the following: 1) a stop-and-go pattern of policy reform, because of political constraints - even though the results of reform were generally positive; 2) weak economic management, resulting in high inflation and a high fiscal and balance of payments deficit; 3) poor management of public spending; 4) mixed performance in exchange-rate management, with periods of substantial overvaluation; 5) financial policies that (despite recent improvements) hamper efficient financial intermediation; 6) prolonged trade protection, followed by selective trade liberalization; 7) continued distortion in agricultural policies; 8) inflexible labor markets and, despite Sri Lanka's outstanding track record on human development, problems with the quality of the labor force. To address a substantially unfinished policy agenda, Sri Lanka needs to intensify efforts to peacefully resolve civil conflict. There is also a need to squarely address its macroeconomic imbalances, involving a sharp reduction in the fiscal deficit, a cutback on public spending and redefinition of spending priorities, improvement of cost recovery for public services, and continuing to improve the management of the exchange rate. In trade policy, eliminate most quanitative restrictions, further reduce tariff protection, simplify the tariff structure, and, possibly, reform customs (to reduce leakage and abuse). Rationalize employment, exit, and bankruptcy regulations and procedures. The authors recommend improvement in communications between government and the private sector. It is necessary for the financial sector to become more competitive by legislating banking reform, giving state-owned banks more autonomy and putting private commercial banks on an equal footing with the two state banks, with the ultimate goal of privatizing the state banks, and also strengthen the supervision of banking. Also in the financial sector the authors have identified a need for privatization in insurance and pension funds to strengthen the capital market. Several aspects of the agricultural sector need to be revamped. Primarily, privatization of the estate plantations, perhaps through long-term management contracts and the gradual sale of share in assets; reduced trade protection; implementation of land reform; strengthen agricultural support; and possibly support rural financing institutions. Lastly, the authors suggest an end to government controls on hiring, firing, and wage setting as well as rationalization in civil service employment decisions.Labor Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,Banks&Banking Reform,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Achieving Shared Growth,Inequality

Offshoring and Unemployment

In this paper, in order to study the impact of offshoring on sectoral and economywide rates of unemployment, we construct a two sector general equilibrium model in which labor is mobile across the two sectors, and unemployment is caused by search frictions. We find that, contrary to general perception, wage increases and sectoral unemployment decreases due to offshoring. This result can be understood to arise from the productivity enhancing (cost reducing) effect of offshoring. If the search cost is identical in the two sectors, or even if the search cost is higher in the sector which experiences offshoring, the economywide rate of unemployment decreases. We also find multiple equilibrium outcomes in the extent of offshoring and therefore, in the unemployment rate. Furthermore, a firm can increase its domestic employment through offshoring. Also, such a firm's domestic employment can be higher than a firm that chooses to remain fully domestic. When we modify the model to disallow intersectoral labor mobility, the negative relative price effect on the sector in which firms offshore some of their activity becomes stronger. In such a case, it is possible for this effect to offset the positive productivity effect, and result in a rise in unemployment in that sector. In the other sector, offshoring has a much stronger unemployment reducing effect in the absence of intersectoral labor mobility than in the presence of it. Finally, allowing for an endogenous number of varieties provides an additional indirect channel, through which sectoral unemployment goes down due to the entry of new firms brought about by offshoring.

Can Offshoring Reduce Unemployment?

In this paper, in order to study the impact of offshoring on sectoral and economy wide rates of unemployment, we construct a two-sector, general-equilibrium model in which labor is mobile across the two sectors, and unemployment is caused by search frictions. We find that, contrary to general perception, wage increases and sectoral unemployment decreases due to offshoring. This result can be understood to arise from the productivity enhancing (cost reducing) effect of offshoring. If the search cost is identical in the two sectors, or is higher in the sector which experiences o¤shoring, the economy wide rate of unemployment decreases. When we modify the model to disallow intersectoral labor mobility, the negative relative price e¤ect on the offshoring sector may offset the positive productivity effect, and result in a rise in unemployment in that sector. In the other sector, offshoring has a much stronger unemployment reducing effect in this case.

Search and Offshoring in the Presence of "Animal Spirits"

In this paper, we introduce two sources of unemployment in a two-factor general equilibrium model: search frictions and fairness considerations. We find that a binding fair-wage constraint increases the unskilled unemployment rate and can at the same time lead to a higher unemployment rate for skilled workers, as compared to an equilibrium where fairness considerations are absent or non-binding. Starting from a constrained equilibrium, an increase in the fairness parameter leads to increases in both skilled and unskilled unemployment. The wage of unskilled workers increases but the wage of skilled workers decreases. Next we allow for offshoring of unskilled jobs in our model, and we find that, as a result, it becomes more likely that the fair-wage constraint binds. Offshoring of unskilled jobs always leads to an increase in skilled wage, a decrease in skilled unemployment and an increase in unskilled unemployment. The presence of fairness considerations increases the adverse impact of offshoring on unskilled unemployment. The unskilled wage can increase or decrease as a result of offshoring.fair wages, unemployment, strategic effect, offshoring

Offshoring and Unemployment: The Role of Search Frictions and Labor Mobility

In a two-sector, general-equilibrium model with labor-market search frictions, we find that wage increases and sectoral unemployment decreases upon offshoring in the presence of perfect intersectoral labor mobility. If, as a result, labor moves to the sector with the lower (or equal) vacancy costs, there is an unambiguous decrease in economywide unemployment. With imperfect intersectoral labor mobility, unemployment in the offshoring sector can rise, with an unambiguous unemployment reduction in the non-offshoring sector. Imperfect labor mobility can result in a mixed equilibrium in which only some firms in the industry offshore, with unemployment in this sector rising.trade, offshoring, search, unemployment

Y2K and Offshoring: The Role of External Economies and Firm Heterogeneity

We construct a model of offshoring with externalities and firm heterogeneity. Due to the presence of externalities, temporary shocks like the Y2K problem can have permanent effects, i.e., they can permanently raise the extent of offshoring in an industry. Also, the initial advantage of a country as a potential host for outsourcing activities can create a lock in effect, whereby late movers have a comparative disadvantage. Furthermore, the existence of firm heterogeneity along with externalities can help explain the dynamic process of offshoring, where the most productive firms offshore first and the others follow later. Finally, we show the possibility of complementarity between two modes of offshoring: FDI and offshore outsourcing.

When Does Legal Origin Matter?

A vast literature documents better economic institutions in common law compared with civil law countries. The present paper argues that legal origin alone is insufficient to explain differences in the quality of economic institutions across countries. Rather, it is the interaction between legal origin and the quality of political institutions that is important. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of 90 countries on entry regulation, a measure of how business friendly economic institutions are towards firms, strongly supports our claim. For example, we find that the number of procedures required to start a business are lower in common law compared with civil law countries by 2.5 procedures or 24.3% of the sample mean. However, this difference varies sharply across the sample of countries with high and low levels of political accountability. It equals a large 3.4 procedures (37% of the sample mean) for the former and a mere 1.1 procedures (9.7% of the sample mean) for the latter. We conclude that legal origin matters for the quality of economic institutions but only when political accountability is high. We provide a plausible explanation for this phenomenon based on recent findings in the literature on political economy.Legal origin; Regulation,; Political institutions

Y2K and Offshoring: The Role of External Economies and Firm Heterogeneity

We construct a model of offshoring with externalities and firm heterogeneity. Due to the presence of externalities, temporary shocks like the Y2K problem can have permanent effects, i.e., they can permanently raise the extent of offshoring in an industry. Also, the initial advantage of a country as a potential host for outsourcing activities can create a lock in effect, whereby late movers have a comparative disadvantage. Furthermore, the existence of firm heterogeneity along with externalities can help explain the dynamic process of offshoring, where the most productive firms offshore first and the others follow later. Finally, we show the possibility of complementarity between two modes of offshoring: FDI and offshore outsourcing.